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Considering the known benefits of near-miss reporting, why are workers on the front lines of the 
process industries – operators and maintenance technicians – still so reluctant to communicate 
their daily experiences? Many have recommended increased operator training or incentive 
programs as solutions, but those mechanisms can only work when leaders already see improved 
safety as a priority. More common are leaders who openly prioritize performance, leaving their 
operators and maintenance workers to make a personal choice between safety and productivity. 
Although safety can usually be deferred, disappointing productivity is guaranteed to have 
immediate, negative consequences. One can hardly blame them for cowing to the whip that hurts 
the most. 
 
It stands to reason that near-miss reporting mechanisms are only as effective as the safety culture 
in which they're implemented. Using research in process safety, psychology, and human 
resources, this paper suggests methods for developing a culture of communication, trust, and 
respect between leaders and workers, resulting in an environment in which near-miss reporting is 






While acknowledging that near-miss reporting can play a prominent role in creating safety 
culture, this paper suggests that it’s not a “one size fits all” solution and shouldn’t be 
implemented until the relationships between leaders and workers have been assessed, including 
any tendencies towards distrust and cynicism. If those failings are found and fixed, improved 
communication will naturally follow, creating an environment in which near-miss reporting 
systems are more likely to succeed.  
 
What is a near miss and why report them? 
 
There is no universally accepted definition of “near miss,” but most definitions contain the 
following elements (CCPS, 2011): 
 
• an event occurs, or the discovery of a potentially unsafe situation 
• the event or unsafe situation had reasonable potential to escalate 
• the potential escalation would have led to adverse impacts 
 
Although these are helpful guidelines, deciding what actually constitutes a near miss is generally 
left to individual organizations.  
 
With or without a clear definition, process safety culture has come to take for granted that near-
miss reporting, when done consistently, is the key to reducing injuries, illnesses and fatalities. In 
fact, it’s not even limited process safety – the fields of nursing, aviation, firefighting, law 
enforcement, and even casual pursuits like recreational cycling, have all studied near misses and 
agreed that they’re important to keep track of. Yet there are also many people who argue that 
Herbert William Heinrich’s 1931 “Accident Pyramid” (Fig. 1), upon which nearly all traditional 
near-miss theories are based, was bad science then and is simply inaccurate now (Johnson, 
2011).  
 
Figure 1 - Heinrich's original accident ratio. Common critiques  
include his reliance on subjective observations and his tendency  
to blame workers instead of systems.  
 
If we don’t have a standard definition of a near miss and can’t even agree that reporting them is 
necessary, what evidence is there to convince companies that a near-miss reporting system is a 
worthwhile endeavor?  
 
What is near-miss reporting good for? 
 
One of the major conclusions drawn from Heinrich’s pyramid (and the variations that have come 
after) is that there are supposed to be a certain number of near misses for every recordable 
incident within an organization; although Heinrich’s original ratio was 10 near misses for every 
incident, modern studies have placed this number at between 50 and 100 (Bridges, 2012). 
According to this line of thinking, if you can just prevent those near misses from taking place, 
you can prevent the illnesses, injuries, and deaths that could have followed. It’s an idea that 
sounds logical, even easy, on the surface, but trying to hit such a moving target is something that 
safety managers seem to be reluctant to sign up for.  
 
Nobody can make them do it, either. OSHA’s PSM standard requires reporting near misses, but 
only those related to potential hazardous material releases. Likewise, their recordkeeping rules 
require there to be a system through which employees can report illness and injuries, but they 
don’t explicitly require reporting of near misses, which by their very nature don’t necessarily 
result in injuries. They recommend near-miss reporting in their Illness and Injury Prevention and 
Voluntary Protection Programs and prohibit policies or procedures that disincentivize reporting, 
but anything beyond that is at the discretion of individual organizations. There are other 
standards, like ANSI Z10 and OHSAS 18001 (Z10’s British counterpart), but they are also 
completely voluntary. Even if near-miss reporting were required, it would be completely 
unenforceable. How do you regulate the reporting of events that never happened?   
 
This lack of compulsion is a bit of a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it gives companies 
the freedom to only implement a reporting system if they feel it’s necessary and then customize 
it to their needs. On the other, it means that there is little standardized guidance available for 
companies that don’t know where to start and nothing at all to compel those that could really use 
a reporting program, but don’t want to spare the time or resources to create one from scratch. 
 
Some organizations have the curiosity and resources to give near-miss reporting a shot, but most 
companies are left to see it in one of two ways: 
 
Pointless: If a company already has a pretty good safety record and no one can make 
them implement a near-miss program, why would they? Even if there’s a chance that it 
will improve their safety (which is, remember, already in a good state), a quick cost-
benefit analysis will tell them that the cultural disruption and upfront costs of a new 
reporting program would be too much of an investment for such a small nudge forward. 
Chances are their safety is in such a good state because they already have a system for 
communicating safety issues, one that’s well-suited for their particular industry and 
culture. It’s not that such a company wants to be particularly unsafe, but they realize that 
their resources are finite and might be better used elsewhere.  
 
Intimidating: In 2013, the petroleum, coal, chemical and plastics/rubber industries in the 
United States had nearly 47,000 recordable incidents (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2014). 
Let’s assume that the lowest modern estimate is correct and there are 50 near misses for 
every incident – that’s more than 2.3 million near misses to be recorded and followed up 
on every year, without accounting for the groundwork it would take to get them reported 
in the first place.  
 
Even if a given company only had 5 incidents per year and 250 near misses (and again, 
that’s on the low end of the expectation), that kind of organizational change still amounts 
to an overhaul of a company’s culture. If they’re already struggling with other aspects of 
safety, including problems that are actually regulated, asking them to go from the 
occasional near-miss report to potentially hundreds per year is going to seem like an 
impossible task. This company doesn’t want to be unsafe either, but they’ve got much 
bigger things on their plate with consequences that are a lot more guaranteed.   
 
 
Then why should a company want a near-miss reporting program at all? 
 
Despite all of its issues, there are a couple of ways that every company could benefit from a 
safety reporting program. As mentioned, near-miss reporting can be included as part of OSHA’s 
Voluntary Protection Program, an initiative that allows companies to submit their safety 
practices for formal review in exchange for temporary immunity from regular inspections, as 
long as their status is maintained. This option is helpful, especially if companies know that they 
are reasonably close to meeting its standards – although at that point, they probably already have 
a good reporting system in place.  
 
If a company doesn’t feel ready for an OSHA review but wants to improve safety practices on 
their own, near-miss reporting can be a useful tool for tracking quantitative data, e.g. what kind 
of accidents happen most often, when they occur, etc. This data is a great way to find out how 
many problems they have and in what areas so the resources necessary for improvement can be 
justified.  
 
But how does a company implement one? 
 
Here’s where we get to the hard part: 
The advice OSHA offers is superficial – an incentive program of safety committee t-shirts, 
“modest rewards,” and recognition parties. Other bodies, like the National Safety Council, have 
recommended involving individual employees, avoiding “blame culture,” and making near 
misses easier to report. These recommendations come with two major flaws: 
 
1. They ignore the very unique dynamics of individual companies and sites; 
2. They place the largest share of responsibility on a single group of people (either 
management or workers) without accounting for any of the complex social mechanisms 
that create unsafe environments and allow them to continue.   
 
An organization can’t be reduced to a group of individual actors. It’s a system, an aggregate of 
“parts which cannot be meaningfully separated from each other” (D.C. Philips, 1972).  
 
Take a single gear of an analog clock, for example. What can you tell by looking at it? What 
does its condition say about the rest of the clock? Can you use that gear to tell time? Asking a 
single group, either workers or management, to repair a safety culture by themselves is like 
asking that gear to wake you up for work in the morning.  It’s an unreasonable and unfair 
expectation.  
 
That’s great, but… how are trust and safety related? 
 
When investigating lapses in safety, we know to look for the root causes of the incident so we 
can prevent it from happening in the future. But what if the information we get from the 
investigation is inaccurate or incomplete? What if the information is never volunteered at all? 
Such is the classic struggle of near-miss reporting.  
 
If information isn’t given voluntarily, managers may assume that safety reporting has to be 
mandatory, perhaps requiring a certain number of near-miss reports per week/month/year to meet 
the expectations of a given safety pyramid (Bridges, 2012). It’s a simple solution, but not 
necessarily a productive one.  
 
Management theory tells us that a safety program can’t rely on a mandate, either explicitly or 
implicitly, without workers inferring that their management doesn’t trust them to determine 
unsafe conditions and report them. If employees perceive that they aren’t trusted by their 
management, they then become distrusting in return, creating a stalemate in which no one trusts 
and no one progresses (McGregor, 1960; Morrison and Milliken, 2000). Therefore, the 
compulsion towards mandatory near-miss reporting can be seen as a symptom of a larger 
problem that has its roots in interpersonal relationships, not necessarily safety.  
 
But if workers can be trusted to volunteer safety observations, why don’t they? It’s not because 
they want to be unsafe or create an unsafe environment. All workers want to know that they and 
their peers can perform as effectively, efficiently, and safely as possible within the constraints of 
a high-stress situation. So when unsafe conditions and near misses aren’t reported, it’s because 
the costs of reporting are perceived as outweighing the benefits. Whether or not this is true 
doesn’t actually matter. When it comes to management practices in the workplace and how 
they’re viewed by employees, perception is reality (Cornell University, 2011). In order for safety 
policies and procedures to be welcomed, accepted and acted upon, perceptions of distrust have to 
be repaired.  
 
Trust: The basics 
 
Most of us can recognize trust when we feel it, but what is it exactly?  
Whitener et al. (1998) offer a three-part definition: 
 
1. One party’s belief that another party will act benevolently; 
2. The willingness of one party to be vulnerable to another; 
3. Voluntary dependency on another party to act in a trustworthy way 
 
Interpersonal trust is, in its most basic form, a social exchange between two individuals, in which 
their personal tendencies to trust and their interactions over time either encourage or discourage 
their mutual perceptions of trustworthiness (Simpson, 2007). In the workplace, feelings of trust 
or distrust also lead to conclusions about a person’s other qualities, such as fairness, reliability, 
competence, commitment, and goodwill.  
 
When coworkers form groups, they tend to compound their individual feelings of trust or distrust 
by engaging in “collective sensemaking,” a process of sharing information and experiences to 
form a group opinion of their working environment (Weick, et al. 2005). The products of 
individual trust and collective sensemaking combine to create the behavior patterns within the 
groups of an organization. Those behavior patterns then form the organization’s culture 
(Gillespie & Dietz, 2009), which strengthens over time (Morgeson and Hoffman, 1999). 
 
Think about your organization: Do workers and middle managers react to new corporate 
initiatives with enthusiasm or do they immediately write them off? Is it clique-ish or do groups 
work with a shared sense of purpose? Although these behaviors are validated and perpetuated by 
group behavior, it’s important to realize that they all originate on the individual level.  
 
What causes distrust? 
 
Humans are incredible learners. From the time we're born, our brains are collecting information, 
storing it and using it as shortcuts to understanding the world. These shortcuts, known as 
schemas, allow us to use information and experiences to develop scripts, or assumptions about 
future experiences and the behavior they will require (Gioia and Poole, 1984). These scripts 
become more complex and organized throughout our lives (Fiske and Taylor, 1984), allowing us 
to grow our knowledge base and alter it as necessary.  
 
In many ways, schemas and scripts make our lives easier. They allow us to “read” people and 
situations and more or less know what to expect from them and what kind of behavior is 
appropriate. We know, for instance, what a business meeting generally looks like - everyone sits 
around a table, makes formal chit-chat (weather, sports, etc.), and listens intently when the most 
senior employee begins to speak. The more often a script like this is validated, the more we 
perceive it to be true until eventually it becomes an expectation. Some scripts are common 
enough that they become conventional within a culture (interviewing for a job, standing in an 
elevator, talking to your boss), while others are more unique to each individual.  
 
Just like individuals within a group share perceptions of trust or distrust, they also share their 
scripts, which then influence the group’s perceptions, beliefs, and expectations of other groups 
and the individuals within them (Schein, 1985). Because group members are more likely to trust 
information from inside the group than from outside (Williams, 2007), the greater the number of 
group members who can confirm variations of a single experience, the stronger the overall 
perception will be.  
 
It’s in this way that small examples of perceived unfair or untrustworthy behavior can determine 
the disposition of one group towards another, regardless of who in the group actually 
experienced the behavior firsthand.  
Table 1 
The Effects of Distrust: An Illustration 
Action 
A worker voluntarily reports a near miss to a member of management, fulfilling 
all the requirements of trust –  in making themselves vulnerable to a higher-up, 
they are displaying their willingness to depend on the benevolence of that 
particular person.  
Response 
 
If that offering of trust is reciprocated with a punitive or blame-ridden 
response, the employee’s behavioral script for “how to handle a near miss” has 
been altered. They no longer see that particular manager as a person with whom 
they can communicate safety information.  
Interpretation 
 
Furthermore, because the manager in question is both an individual and a 
member of a group (“management”), their action will now alter the employee’s 
perception of management as a whole, reducing the likelihood that they will 
communicate safety information to any member of the group. 
Result #1 
 
The potential positive benefits of safety communication have been stifled by 
the immediate negative consequences from a single individual.  
Extrapolation 
 
When that worker returns to their group (“employees”) and reports that their 
voluntary vulnerability hasn’t paid off, the group will use the second-hand 
experience to inform their own behavioral scripts.  
Result #2 The behavior of a single manager has caused an entire group of employees to view safety reporting as a risky proposition.   
 
Better Safety Management Through Trust 
 
Traditional management wisdom says that leaders and managers should control their 
organizations by handing down instructions to subordinates without asking for feedback 
(Glauser, 1984). Likewise, if a manager’s script already tells them that subordinates are lazy and 
can’t be trusted to act in the organization’s best interests, they come to believe that 
communication from below should be ignored and discouraged, especially if this script has been 
verified by other members of the “management” group (Morrison & Milliken, 2000). Although 
it’s unrealistic to say that an organization’s management can be solely responsible for trust 
repair, this unequal balance of power and tendency towards non-communication means that the 
process will work best when initiated from the top down.  
 
Perceptions of trust are easy to destroy and difficult to rebuild, which means that leaders have to 
be very intentional and targeted in the ways they attempt to reform their organization’s culture. 
Showing is more important than telling, doing is more important than demanding, and 
consistency is key.  It’s impossible to “un-ring the bell” of untrustworthy behavior, but it is 
possible to mitigate perceptions and improve them over time.  
 
• Demonstrating Priorities  
When making safety decisions, workers are being asked to evaluate safety against 
multiple other demands from both superiors and peers, including production, cooperation, 
and efficiency. Their challenge is to satisfy as many of those demands as possible within 
the time and resource constraints placed on them (Guy, 1990), which are among the 
strongest indicators of an organization’s real priorities (Gillespie and Dietz, 2009). 
 
Therefore, even if leaders say that safety is important, personnel will infer that it’s not 
actually a priority until or unless the appropriate time and resources are made available. 
Even when workers prioritize safety for their own benefit, insufficient resources mean 
that they’re forced to make decisions based on what is possible, not necessarily based on 
what is right.  
 
When leaders show integrity in what they say (“safety is always important”) and 
consistency in what they do (allocating resources to safety), employees view them as 
more trustworthy and are more willing to share information with them (Whitener et al., 
1998). When leadership behavior is inconsistent or lacks integrity, employees collectively 
believe that their leaders are incompetent, unreliable, and incapable of positive change. 
This creates a culture of distrust, cynicism, and poor communication (DeCelles et al., 
2013), all of which are roadblocks to organizational improvement.  
 
• Standardizing Priorities and Perceiving Them Accurately 
If safety is demonstrated and reinforced at a policy level, it then has to be equally 
demonstrated in the actions of all management and personnel. This means making sure 
that all employees, regardless of rank, consistently behave in a way that prioritizes safety 
so that it can become a cornerstone of the organization’s culture (Guy, 1990). This 
congruence lends credibility to organizational improvement efforts (Kouzes and Posner, 
2002), which means it should exist before improvements are even attempted. Without it, 
chances of successful culture reform are drastically reduced.  
 
It’s also important that each group accurately perceives which safety elements matter to 
other groups and why. Take, for example, Sharon Clarke’s 1999 study on hierarchical 
safety perceptions. As could be expected, she found that workers, supervisors and 
managers think about safety improvement in different ways. More interesting, however, 
were the misperceptions she found each group had about the others: 
 
1. Workers viewed themselves as prioritizing unsafe conditions and operational 
functions, but saw managers and supervisors as both prioritizing local 
management.  
2. Supervisors said that managers placed less importance on quality working 
conditions than workers did.   
3. Managers said workers didn’t value local management or managerial decisions, 
and said supervisors didn’t prioritize local management or working conditions.  
 
It doesn’t matter that the study proved most of these assumptions to be inaccurate. What 
matters is that they created stereotypes and scripts that directly affected how the groups 
interacted and what they expected from each other. With this small sample, we see how 
the divisions of group identities, when allowed to deepen, can create barriers to 
communication and trust.  
 
Table 2 
Trust and Safety Management in Practice: A Case Study 
Although solutions can’t generally be copied and pasted from one company to another, we can 
learn a lot from looking at the causes of problems in other organizations. 
The following case study provides valuable insight into how distrust can affect communication 
and organizational change in a high-risk industry. 
The Study 
In 2009, researchers Gunningham and Sinclair studied Australian mining companies and 
documented their attempts to reform their health and safety programs at the instruction of 
corporate-level leaders. One company in particular exemplified a culture of distrust. 
 
This company held a strong “beyond compliance” corporate attitude towards safety, evident in 
their well-established OHS program, which included internal audits, an interactive OHS database, 
and a behavior-based safety observation program at all mine sites. It was found, however, that 
despite the strong top-down emphasis on safety, the program was not implemented successfully 
across the range of sites.  
 
After assessing 5 years’ worth of audit data, they found that the lowest-performing mine had 
nearly twice the number of safety incidents as the highest-performing mine. Through interviews 
with a range of managers and workers at each site, the researchers were able to attribute the 




• Workers stated they were unlikely to report incidents and 
discuss safety issues with management because they feared 
blame. 
• Workers were resistant to behavior-based safety programs 
because they did not trust the motives behind them.  
• Workers sometimes chose to dismiss safety procedures because 
they resented being told how to do their jobs.  
• These effects were the most prominent at mines that were 
geographically isolated and had experienced significant safety 
incidents and high management turnover.  
Lapses in local 
implementation 
• Low-level safety managers (all of whom were promoted from 
the internal workforce) had to straddle the line between 
management, who they ultimately had to report to, and workers, 
who they had to work with on a daily basis. Fearing worker 
backlash, they were reluctant to implement safety programs.  
• Managers reported receiving little support from their 
supervisors on safety decisions, particularly when the decisions 
would have an adverse effect on the mine’s production.  
• Managers reported an unwillingness to institute safety programs 
that would increase their workload while producing few obvious 
benefits. 
“That’s not my job.” 
• Safety managers were frustrated by the lack of cooperation from 
middle management, who viewed production as their core 
management responsibility, not the implementation of safety 
programs. 
• Middle managers resisted implementing safety programs as a 
way to retain autonomy and power within their mines, resulting 
in an impeded flow of information to safety managers and 
workers.  
• Much like the safety managers and workers below them, middle 
managers failed to prioritize a safety program because they 
perceived the costs as outweighing the immediate benefits.  
Conclusions 
• Staff at all levels of an organization have to believe that safety programs are being 
implemented for positive reasons, and they need to explicitly know what those reasons are. 
• Staff at all levels have to believe that their leaders and peers are committed to safety for 
benevolent reasons unrelated to control and oversight.  
• If workers are presented with competing values, they will follow the value they perceive to 
be most valid based on the behavior of leaders and peers.  
 
 
• Blame vs Respect 
In a culture of blame (exhibited in Tables 2 and 3), members of one group come to expect 
harm from members of another group and change their behavior accordingly, becoming 
defensive, avoidant, or just generally uncooperative (Williams, 2007). Because their trust 
is damaged, both groups view each other with suspicion and perceive their actions as 
incompetent and illegitimate. They’ve been burned once and they don’t want to be 
burned again, so they stop communicating and refuse to make themselves vulnerable. 
    
On the other hand, if groups have accurate perceptions of one another and an open 
channel of communication, they come to feel respected and believe they can exchange 
ideas without reprisal. Because they feel respected, groups see their organization’s 
policies and procedures as fair, honest, and legitimate. As long as these values are in 
place, rule compliance is likely to be voluntary (Gunningham and Sinclair, 2007).  
 
 
Conclusion: Without trust, a voluntary reporting program will not succeed.  
 
If you have a near-miss program and it’s not working the way you want it to, your reporting 
program might not be the problem. Voluntary reporting between workers and leaders requires a 
high level of trust and communication, which means that all the incentives and mandates in the 
world won’t make up for a sub-par culture. If you don’t already have a near-miss program in 
place, you may not want to attempt one until you’re sure your organization is ready for it.  
 
How do you know if your trust culture needs to be repaired? Do a quick, honest self-assessment 
and see if you recognize any of these signs of dysfunction: 
 
- Attitudes of apathy and resignation 
- Scapegoating and absence of accountability 
- High stress and low morale 
- Grudge-holding and back-biting 
- Reluctance to communicate honestly, even in one-on-one situations 
- Unreasonably high workloads and impossible expectations 
 
If these symptoms are present and you feel like your safety program is suffering as a result, you 
may want to start by discussing your concerns with an independent third party. This can be a 
management consultant, or even just a colleague who is not directly involved with operations. 
The important thing is that they can objectively review your findings and help you see any 
additional problems you may have become blind to, without the conflict of interest that would 
arise from discussing it with someone who is impacted by production-related safety initiatives.  
 
Once you’ve recognized the issues, you’ll want to formulate a strategy for improvement. Who 
actually leads the effort will ultimately depend on your organization – some may find their 
culture so disagreeable that only a hired hand can reform it, while others may have a highly 
trusted, intuitive veteran on their staff who would be suited to the task.  
 
After a strategy has been put in place, it’s up to all members of the organization, from CEOs to 
operators, to play an active role in their own culture reform. It will probably be met with some 
wariness and skepticism. It may feel risky and uncomfortable for everyone involved.  But until 




Bureau of Labor Statistics. Employer-Reported Workplace Injuries and Illnesses – 2013 U.S. 
Department of Labor, 4 Dec. 2014; Web; 18 July, 2015; Table 2.  
Center for Advanced Human Resource Studies. Perception is reality: How employees perceive 
what motivates HR practices affects their engagement, behavior and performance. Cornell 
University, ILR School, June 2011; Web; 18 July, 2015.  
CCPS. "Process Safety Leading and Lagging Metrics - You Don't Improve What You Don't 
Measure." Center for Chemical Process Safety of the American Institute of Chemical Engineers, 
2011. Web. 18 July 2015.  
Clarke, Sharon. "Perceptions of Organizational Safety: Implications for the Development of 
Safety Culture." Journal of Organizational Behavior 20.2 (1999): 185-98. Print.  
 
Decelles, Katherine A., Paul E. Tesluk, and Faye S. Taxman. "A Field Investigation of 
Multilevel Cynicism Toward Change." Organization Science 24.1 (2013): 154-71. Print.  
 
Fiske, Susan T., and Shelley E. Taylor. Social Cognition. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Pub., 
1984. Print.  
 
Gillespie, N., and G. Dietz. "Trust Repair After An Organization-Level Failure." Academy of 
Management Review 34.1 (2009): 127-45. Print.  
 
Gioia, D. A., and C. C. Manz. "Linking Cognition and Behavior: A Script Processing 
Interpretation of Vicarious Learning." Academy of Management Review 19 (1985): 527-39. Print.  
 
Glauser, M. J. "Upward Information Flow in Organizations: Review and Conceptual Analysis." 
Human Relations 37 (1984): 613-43. Print.  
 
Gunningham, Neil, and Darren Sinclair. "Organizational Trust and the Limits of Management-
Based Regulation." Law & Society Review 43.4 (2009): 865-900. Print.  
 
Guy, Mary E. "High-Reliability Management." Public Productivity & Management Review 13.4 
(1990): 301-13. Print.  
 
Harris, Stanley G. "Organizational Culture and Individual Sensemaking: A Schema-Based 
Perspective." Organization Science 5.3 (1994): 309-21. Print.  
 
Johnson, Ashley. "Examining the Foundation: Were Heinrich's Theories Valid, and Do They 
Still Matter?" Safety + Health. National Safety Council, 11 Oct. 2011. Web. 27 Aug. 2015.  
 
Kouzes, James M., and Barry Z. Posner. The Leadership Challenge. 3rd ed. San Francisco: 
Jossey-Bass, 2002. Print.  
 
McGregor, Douglas. The Human Side of Enterprise. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960. Print.  
 
Michaels, David. "OSHA Voluntary Protection Programs | Further Improvements to VPP - 
8/14/14." OSHA Voluntary Protection Programs. OSHA, 14 Aug. 2014. Web. 20 July 2015.  
 
Morgeson, Frederick P., and David A. Hofmann. "The Structure and Function of Collective 
Constructs: Implications for Multilevel Research and Theory Development." The Academy of 
Management Review 24.2 (1999): 249-65. Print.  
 
Morrison, Elizabeth Wolfe, and Frances J. Milliken. "Organizational Silence: A Barrier to 
Change and Development in a Pluralistic World." The Academy of Management Review 25.4 
(2000): 706-25. Print.  
 
OSHA; National Safety Council Alliance. "Near Miss Reporting Systems." National Safety 
Council, 1 May 2013. Web. 20 July 2015.  
 
Phillips, D. C. "The Methodological Basis of Systems Theory." Academy of Management 
Journal 15.4 (1972): 469-77. Print.  
 
Schein, Edgar H. Organizational Culture and Leadership. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1985. 
Print.  
 
Simpson, J. A. “Foundations of interpersonal trust.” Social psychology: Handbook of basic 
principles (2nd ed.). Eds.  A. W. Kruglanski & E. T. Higgins. New York: Guilford, 2007. 587-
607. Print. 
 
Weick, K. E., K. M. Sutcliffe, and D. Obstfeld. "Organizing and the Process of Sensemaking." 
Organization Science 16.4 (2005): 409-21. Print.  
 
Whitener, E. M., S. E. Brodt, M. A. Korsgaard, and J. M. Werner. "Managers As Initiators Of 
Trust: An Exchange Relationship Framework For Understanding Managerial Trustworthy 
Behavior." Academy of Management Review 23.3 (1998): 513-30. Print.  
 
Williams, M. "Building Genuine Trust Through Interpersonal Emotion Management: A Threat 
Regulation Model Of Trust And Collaboration Across Boundaries." Academy of Management 
Review 32.2 (2007): 595-621. Print.  
 
